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The  long-run  decline  in  Japan’s  birth  rate  implies  that  Japan  will  have  both  a 
declining and an aging population. Because the labor force is expected to decrease, 
the  most  serious  effect  of  this  trend  is  a  decrease  in  the  number  of  persons 
supporting  the  Japanese  social  security  system.  The  Japanese  social  security 
system  consists  of  four  major  components:  public  assistance,  public  health 
maintenance,  social  insurance  and  social  welfare  services.  Japan  has  a  social 
insurance  system  covering  the  entire  population  and  family  allowances  for  the 
elderly,  sickness,  work  injury,  and  unemployment.  The  aging  of  population  has 
increased the pension benefits being paid out, as well as health and long-term care 
insurance.  Most  of  the  benefits  paid  for  the  elderly  under  the  public  health 
insurance system have been financed through social insurance premiums paid by 
the  working  generations.  In  this  environment,  many  researchers  are  concerned 
Despite a decrease in the number of working generations supporting 
Japan’s social security system, the relationship between public pension 
benefits and health care expenditures since the inception of universal 
health insurance system has not been explored. We obtained one stable 
long-run equilibrium relationship among those three variables over the 
period  from  1966  to  2002.  We  employed  the  forecast  error  variance 
decomposition to examine the determination of social insurance burden 
rate. It is found that health care shock was important for the long-run 
determination of social insurance burden rate.   
Because it appears that a free health service system for the elderly 
(health care shock) caused the increase in the doctor's consultation, we 
estimated the health care function to analyze price policy in the health 
care sector. We finally accepted the dynamic OLS model with lead lags as 
an aggregated health care function. The price elasticity of health care 
has  declined  in  absolute  value  since  the  universal  health  insurance 
system started, and it has been around 0.6 since the early 1980s. The 
policy which eliminated health care fees for the elderly in the 1970s was 
a mistake since the elderly increased their health care expenditures. The 
out-of-pocket expenses for health care of the elderly should have been 
raised in the 1970s.   2
about how to pay for health care expenditures and limit the public pension burden. 
This study focuses on health care expenditures and public pension benefits because 
these costs occupy large shares of social security in Japan. 
In 1973, a revision of the Welfare Law for the Aged eliminated health care fees 
for  the  elderly.  Our  question  is  what  happened  next.  Did  the  social  insurance 
burden rate increase? Did health care expenditures rise because of public pension 
wealth increase? Since the inception of the universal health insurance system, the 
long-run relationship between public pension benefits and health care expenditures 
in Japan has not been examined. We examine the relationship among the social 
insurance burden rate, health care expenditures and public pension and explore the 
policy which eliminated health care fees for the elderly in this paper.   
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the social security system in Japan. Social 
insurance schemes and taxation constitute the main revenues of the social security 
system. In Section 3, we investigate the long-run relationships among health care 
expenditures,  public  pension  benefits  and  the  social  insurance  burden  rate.  The 
relationship between public pension benefits and health care expenditures appears 
to have changed in 2002, when the prices of medical services and drugs were cut by 
an  average  of 2.7  percent.  We  thus  investigate  the  hypothesis  that  increases  in 
pension benefits caused an increase in health care expenditures during the period 
1966-2002. Section 4 presents new empirical  evidence of aggregated health care 
function,  while  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  serial  correlation  for  the  residuals  of 
cointegration regression model is rejected. Section 5 concludes with a summary and 
a discussion of extensions of our work. 
 
2 Overview of Social Security System in Japan 
 
In 1961, a universal health insurance system and pensions for all Japanese 
citizens  were  put  into  effect.  The  health  care  system  is  based  on  a  compulsory 
health  insurance  scheme  through  income-based  premiums.  Social  insurance 
schemes  and  taxation  constitute  the  main  sources  of  health  funding  in  Japan. 
Approximately half of the national health care expenditures are financed by health 
insurance plans and the remainder is financed by subsidies from the government, 
co-payments and other out-of-pocket expenses. 
 
2-1. Health Insurance 
Japan’s  health  insurance  covers  entire  population.  Many  people  in  Japan 
obtain their insurance via employer-related groups. For example, employees of large 
companies  and  their  dependent  family  members  enroll  in  plans  for  which 
occupation-based cooperatives are the insurers. Insurance societies or mutual aid 
societies are established in industries. Most of the employer-group plans require 
copayments for dependents. These plans also have a catastrophic cap feature that 
limits monthly out-of-pocket expenses.1  Japanese public health insurance systems 
are roughly classified into [1] insurance for employees and their dependents, [2] 
insurance for the self-employed, retirees and their dependents, and [3] insurance for 
the  elderly.  Retired  persons  are  covered  by  the  plan  with  contributions  from 
employment  and  community  plans  plus  funds  from  both  national  and  local 
                                                   
1  When the monthly out-of-pocket amount was higher than the ceiling, the excess amount was paid 
back to the patient from insurance funds. A ceiling on patient cost-sharing was introduced for the first 
time in 1973.   3
governments, with small copayments for patients at the time of medical service.   
The first type of insurance is Employee’s Health Insurance, which consists of 
Government-managed Health Insurance (GHI), Society-managed Health Insurance 
(SHI), Mutual Aid Associations (MAA) and Seamen’s Insurance (SI). GHI includes 
workers employed by small and medium-sized companies. The insurer of GHI is the 
national government. The GHI received around 8.3 percent of the insured’s monthly 
income in the 1990s, evenly split between employer and employee. In SHI, large 
firms organize their own insurance group instead of making their employees enroll 
with GHI. MAA includes national and local public employees and private school 
teachers and staff. Self-employed individuals, farmers, and retired employees enroll 
in  National  Health  Insurance  (NHI)  for  which  municipalities  are  the  insurers. 
Employees' Insurance contributes to NHI to cover retired employees. For most NHI 
insurers, the premium is supplemented by governmental subsidies.   
In 1982, a Health Care System for the Elderly (HCSE) was established. The 
elderly was defined as age 70 and over in the 1990s. The definition of the elderly has 
changed in the 2000s. Since October 2002, the minimum eligibility age has been 
increased by one year each year and continued to rise until it reached 75 in October 
2007.  Seniors  75  and  older  enroll  in  HCSE  and  receive  benefits  through 
contributions from other insurance plans. It is well known that one of the major 
causes  for  the  financial  difficulty  of  health  insurers  is  the  Contribution  for  the 
HCSE  (Rojin-hoken-kyosyutsukin),  which  is  imposed  on  insurers  to  finance  the 
health care expenditures of the elderly.   
        Reimbursement to health care providers is uniform across regions with little 
concern for differences in the type of facility or severity of illness because the fee 
schedule and drug prices are set by the government. According to Campbell and 
Ikegami (1998), the fee schedule is decided in a key biennial negotiation between 
insures  and  providers,  and  that  forum  ʕ  the  Central  Social  Insurance  Medical 
Care  Council  (Chuikyo)  ʕ  has  provided  a  mechanism  for  dealing  with  many 
recurring issues in a routine way with very restricted participation. Campbell and 
Ikegami  (1998)  explained  that  the  Japan  Medical  Association  (Nihon  Ishikai) 
dominates the provider’s side in the Central Council in terms of both income growth 
and their share of medical spending. Since all reimbursement is  regulated by a 
uniform fee schedule, it is possible for the government to exert moderately rigid 
control over total expenditures.   
 
2-2. Public Pension   
The  public  pension  system  in  Japan  is  constituted  of  Employee’s  pension 
insurance,  National  pension,  Mutual  Aid  Association  of  National  Government 
Employees, Mutual Aid Associations of Local Government Employees and others.2 
The  public  pension  system  was  established  at  a  time  when  the  percentage  of 
workers  other  than  wage-earners  in  the  labor  force  was  relatively  high.  The 
National  Pension  System  was  created  to  cover  the  self-employed  and  others; 
together with the existing Employees' pension and various mutual aid pensions. In 
1973,  revised  national  pension  regulations  introduced  a  sliding  scale  reflecting 
changes in commodity prices; this change raised pension levels. In 1986, the Basic 
Pension was instituted and the National Pension System was reorganized into two 
                                                   
2  Payments through the NTT mutual benefit association, the JR mutual benefit association and the 
JT mutual benefit association or their antecedent associations are included in Employee’s pension 
insurance from FY 1997.   4
tiers:  a  basic  pension  of  fixed  benefits  and  a  second  tier  of  remuneration-based 
benefits to replace the Employees' pension. The first tier pension is the national 
pension, to which people contribute between ages 20 to 60. For the national pension, 
the insured population is classified into [1] students and the self-employed, who 
make their insurance contributions as individuals, [2] salaried persons working for 
companies, and [3] spouses who are supported by salaried persons. Those spouses 
are exempt from insurance contributions.   
The  government  has  been  implementing  structural  reforms  to  the  social 
security system. In 2000, employees` pension benefits for new recipients were cut 
by 5 percent in order to improve the finances, and the wage-slide system was frozen. 
The pension reform of 2004 introduced a mechanism by which benefits would be 
adjusted by keeping the income replacement rate at no less than 50%. 
 
3  Long-Run  Equilibrium  Relationships  among  Social  Insurance  Burden  Rate, 
Health Care Expenditures and Public Pension   
 
The introduction of a public pension system can substantially alter the amount 
of  individual  lifetime  savings.  It  is  well  known  that  such  changes  are  the 
consequences of three effects. Those are (1) the retirement effect, (2) the wealth 
substitution effect and (3) the bequest effect. When individuals reach the age at 
which they can begin to receive benefits through the public pension system, they 
may be induced to retire earlier than they might have otherwise. This retirement 
effect tends to increase household savings. If workers in younger generation view 
contributions to public pension as a means of saving for their future benefits, they 
will tend to save less on their own. This phenomenon is referred to as the wealth 
substitution  effect  which  tends  to  reduce  household  savings.  Since  the  social 
insurance system tends to shift income from working generation to elderly people, 
parents may save more to increase bequests to their children so as to offset the 
intra-generational distributional effect. This is referred to as the bequest effect. 
Taking into account these three effects at the same time, Feldstein (1996) found 
the coefficient on social security wealth is statistically significant value of 0.028 by 
econometric analysis. This positive sign suggests that the wealth substitution effect 
dominates  the  retirement  and  bequest  effect.  Thus,  increases  in  public  pension 
wealth (social security wealth) increase consumption and hence, decrease savings. 
As pointed out by Feldstein (1974), the existence of a public pension system will 
reduce household  savings assuming that the wealth replacement effect is larger 
than the induced retirement effect, and national savings will also be reduced if the 
pension  system  is  a  pay-as-you-go  system.  Empirical  work  on Japan  using  time 
series  aggregated  data  has  tended  to  find  that  the  public  pension  system  has 
reduced household savings (see, e.g., Nakayama 1997, Kumagai 2000).   
On the other hand, can health care be a necessity at the individual and market 
levels and a luxury at the country level? A pioneering study by Newhouse (1977) 
revealed  that  income  elasticity  of  health  care  is  small  within-country  and  the 
cross-national estimate exceeds unity since the nation as a whole faces the full costs 
of health care consumption and health care is largely financed by the state or the 
country.3  However,  highly  aggregated  data  such  as  national  income  or  national 
                                                   
3 It  is  known  that  in  contrast  with  time-series  studies,  cross-section  analysis  commonly  produce 
estimates of income elasticity of less than one. Cross-section estimates may have been misspecified 
because of omitted variables (McGuire et al. 1993). To avoid complicated calculations, the variance of   5
health care expenditures do not necessarily imply individual behavior (Parkin et al. 
1987).  Because  the  individual’s  response  to  greater  income  is  different  than  the 
nation’s response to greater income (see Getzen 2000), the level of observation in an 
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Figure  1  Social  Insurance  Burden  Rate,  Health  Care  Expenditures  and  Public 
Pension Benefits   
 
We can see a boost in the social insurance burden rate over the period from 
1975  to 1985  in  Figure  1.  In  1973, a  revision  of  the  Welfare  Law  for  the  Aged 
eliminated health care fees for the elderly. The system was called a free health 
                                                                                                                                                     
the income elasticity as a function of both the constant term and the slope of regression equation to be 
estimated is as an approximation in the mean time (Parkin et al. 1987). 
4 Getzen  (2000)  notes  that  symptoms  of  illness  and  pain  are  often  more  important  reasons  for 
individuals to seek out the doctor, while the available health care resources and technologies at the 
national level often reflect the nation’s economic well-being.    6
service system for the elderly (Fukawa 2002).5  When the patient cost-sharing of the 
elderly changed, did the ratio of health care expenditures to consumption increase? 
Or  did  health  care  expenditures  rise  because  of  an  increase  in  public  pension 
wealth? Since the inception of the universal health insurance system, the long-run 
equilibrium relationship between public pension and health care expenditures in 
Japan has not been examined.   
Both the data of health care expenditures per month of all households and the 
social insurance burden rate of the working households are from the Annual Report 
on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey. The data on public pension benefits 
per  beneficiaries  were  obtained  from  the  number  of  total  public  pension 
beneficiaries and the total public pension benefits paid out. Since the mid-1990s, 
this  series  has  declined  because  the  number  of  new  recipients  of  employees` 
pension has increased. The source of data on the public pension is The Year Book of 
Social Security Statistics (Prime Minister’s Office). We can use those data over the 
sample period from 1963 to 2004. However, the sample period of this study ends in 
2002 because prices of medical services and drugs were cut by an average of 2.7 
percent in the 2002 regular biennial review. The review led to a change in overall 
health  spending  of  –0.7  percent  for  the  first  time  in  the  history,  then  the 
relationship between public pension and health care expenditures in Japan appears 
to change.  6  We thus investigated that the hypothesis that an increase of pension 
benefits  increased  health  care  expenditures  during  the  period  1966-2002.  We 
constructed a stationary relationship among non-stationary variables concerned in 
the long-run. 
To perform the standard statistical inferences in a regression analysis in which 
non-stationary time series data are used, we analyze the data generating processes 
of the variables concerned using the unit root tests. As the results of Dickey-Fuller 
tests (Dickey and Fuller 1979) and GLS-detrended DF tests (Elliot, Rothenberg and 
Stock 1996), the unit root hypothesis was not rejected at the 5 percent significance 
level for the natural logarithm of X, Y and Z. Those variables X, Y and Z are health 
care expenditure per month, public pension benefits per beneficiaries and the social 
insurance  burden  rate,  respectively.  Continuing  with  the  tests,  the  unit  root 
hypothesis was rejected at the 1 percent significance level for the first difference 
series of those variables. Therefore, we can consider that all stochastic variables are 
integrated of order one.   
The absence of a stationary linear combination implies that there is no long-run 
relation among the variables, so that these variables may drift away from each 
other  over  time.  In  addition  to  a  long-run  relationship,  there  may  be  short-run 
interactions  among  the  variables;  we  employ  a  cointegration  model  for  vector 
autoregressions involving the variables in differenced form.
                                                   
5  The government revisited the health insurance system in 1984. Fukawa (2002) pointed out that the 
most important point of this revision was the introduction of a deductible, or 10 percent cost-sharing to 
be paid by the insured persons. According to Fukawa (2002), before the revision, the insured was 
granted full benefits for health care expenses, except for the first visit fee and for the hospitalization 
charge. 
6  The coverage  of  national  health  care  expenditures  (NHCE) was changed  by  the  introduction  of 
public long-term care insurance in 2000. In that year, about 6 percent of NHCE was transferred to 
public long-term care insurance. To expand the sample period, we had to use make the wider data of 
health care expenditures, which include the conventional services of long-term care.    7
Let  t z   be  the  n ×1  vector  of  time  series  in  the  model  and  t z
'     be  the  r  
stationary linear combinations. Then the variables in the system are connected by 
the set of  n  dynamic equations: 
 
        t z =  + t t
p
j
j t j u z z        
 
 




   ˚                                                                   (1) 
 
j     is a  n×n  coefficient matrix,      is a vector of constants,      is an  n×r   matrix 
of  adjustment  parameters,      is  an  n × r   matrix  and  t u   is  an  n ×1  vector  of 
white  noise  error  processes  in  Equation  1.  The  symbol  ˚A  means  the  first 
difference  of  A.  Once  the  cointegrating  rank  has  been  determined,  the 
corresponding  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of  the  parameters  of  the  r  
cointegrating equations are contained in the matrix  . If only one cointegrating 
relation  is  found,  the  parameters  of  this  equation  are  unique  up  to  a  factor  of 
proportionality. 
Johansen’s  method  (Johansen  1988,  1992)  was  adopted  to  test  for  the 
cointegrating relationship among variables concerned. The number of cointegrating 
relationships and the problem of whether an intercept and/or trend terms need to be 
considered  can  be  simultaneously  treated  in  this  method.  If  the  null  of  no 
cointegration  is  rejected  for  the  model  tested,  then  the  number  of  cointegration 
vectors  is  determined.  As  Engle  and  Granger  (1987)  showed,  in  the  case  of  p  
variables  system,  the  maximum  number  of  cointegration  vectors  is  1   p .  If  the 
error correcting term estimated satisfies the stationary condition as a result of the 
test, statistical interpretation of long-run equilibrium is given to the term.   
The null hypothesis of the cointegration test is  k r H   : 0 , and the alternative 
hypothesis is  k r H   : 1 , where  r   and  k   is the maximum number of cointegration 
vectors and the number of variables in the system, respectively. The cointegration 
test was applied to the data over the sample period from 1966 to 2002 since 3 lags 
are  needed  to  estimate  the  vector  error  correction  model  (VECM).  Before 
implementing cointegration analysis, we first  determined the lag length (k) and 
conducted  diagnostic  tests  for  the  residuals.  Using  the  likelihood-ratio  test,  the 
VECM  with  k  =  2  was  determined.  Diagnostic  tests  on  the  residuals  of  each 
equation supported the VECM with two lags. 
 
Table 1 Results of Cointegration Test                                   
Sample: 1966-2002 
Hypothesized Trace
Cointegrating eq Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.
None  0.48 36.05 35.19 0.04
At most 1 0.25 11.51 20.26 0.49
  8
Table 2 Vector Error Correction Model                                 
Sample: 1966-2002 
Cointegrating Vector 
                     [6.65]  [7.00]       [2.14]
lnX=7.70+0.65lnY+0.63lnZ

Coefficients of Speed of Adjustment 
˚lnZ ˚lnX ˚lnY
-0.100 0.025 0.131
[-3.61] [0.73] [ 2.55] 
 
Johansen  cointegration  methods  were  used  to  determine  the  number  of 
cointegrating vectors. The results of the cointegration test are summarized in Table 
1. The trace tests reject the hypothesis of no cointegrating vector at the 5 percent 
level, but fail to reject the null of one cointegrating vector. This result suggests that 
there is one stable long-run equilibrium relationship. Table 2 shows the estimation 
results of VECM with the dummy variable, which takes the value of one in 1973. 
T-values are shown in square brackets. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
was not rejected at the 5 percent significance level using the Lagrange Multiplier 
procedure.   
We produced the VECM model for all the endogenous variables in the model 
and used it to examine the long-run determination of social insurance burden rate. 
Long-run causality was determined by the error correction term, whereby if it was 
significant, then it indicated evidence of long run causality from the explanatory 
variable to the dependent variable. As the results of the estimation, coefficients of 
speed of adjustment indicate that X (health care expenditure per month) does not 
play a role of adjustment in the system.7 
The  forecast  error  variance  decomposition  shows  the  proportion  of  the 
movements in a sequence due to the different shocks. In order to identify each shock, 
we used the Choleski decomposition. The ordering is social insurance burden rate 
ˠ  health care expenditures per month  ˠ  public pension benefits per beneficiaries. 
The alternative orderings yield similar variance decomposition.8  The proportion of 
forecast error variance in social insurance burden rate h periods ahead accounted 
for by three shocks. Figure 2 shows the variance decomposition of social insurance 
burden rate. After the first six years, a health care shock accounts for 50 percent of 
the variance of social insurance burden rate. We can consider that health care shock 
                                                   
7  Kumagai and Takabayashi (2008) showed a simple theoretical analysis under the pay-as-you-go 
system where both the public pension and health insurance is defined to be a program in which each 
contribution equals benefits in each period.  For simplicity, they did not take into account pension 
benefits for spouses who are exempt from insurance contributions. They carried out Granger causality 
tests  (Granger 1969)  using  the  VECM  model with  two lags. Granger-causality statistics  examine 
whether the lagged values of one variable help to predict another variable. Short-run causality was 
determined with a test on the joint significance of the lagged explanatory variables, using an F-test. As 
the result of Granger’s causality test at the 1 percent significance level, they found a one-way causal 
relationship; the increase in health care expenditures causes a rise in public pension benefits and a 
hike in the social insurance burden rate in the short run.  
8 If the correlations among the various innovations are small, the identification problem is not likely to 
be important.     9
is important for the long-run determination of social insurance burden rate. 
What was a health care shock in Japan? It appears that a major health care 
shock was the start of free health service system for the elderly in 1973. Ogura and 
Futagami  (1992)  revealed  that  the  decline  in  cerebrovascular  disease  mortality 
after 1965 accounts for 50 percent of the increase in the number of elderly people in 
Japan. As the results of the estimation using aggregate data, they found that the 
increase  in  the  doctor's  consultation  of  the  elderly  who  had  hypertension 
contributed to the decline in cerebrovascular disease mortality.9  It is possible that 
the increase in the doctor's consultation was caused by the policy which eliminated 
health care fees for the elderly. In next section, we analyze the pricing policy in the 



















Figure 2 Variance Decomposition of Social Insurance Burden Rate   
 
4 Health Care Function: VECM or Dynamic OLS ? 
 
We must pay attention to the relationship between the aging of the population 
and the health care system at the macro level. Although age effects are also absent 
from  seminal  study  by  Newhouse  (1977),  the link  between  aging and  aggregate 
health care expenditures cannot be viewed as a simple demand function because the 
supply of workers in the market depends on the wage rate which mirrors the prices 
that have to be paid for the health care services provided (Zweifel and Ferrari 1992). 
Thus, aging affects not only the demand side but also the supply side of health 
care.10 
Because public long-term care insurance was introduced in 2000, we estimate 
the health care function to analyze the price policy in the health care sector over the 
sample period from 1958 to 2000. The base year of the function is 2000 and the 
                                                   
9  The  doctor's  consultation  after  1976  had  little  changed.  Therefore,  they  argued  whether  their 
empirical results were robust or not. 
10  The expected positive relationship between the ratio of the elderly and health care expenditures 
have often failed to materialize. Some studies (Schneider and Brody 1983, Myers and Manton 1984, 
Wolfe 1986) focusing on the impact of health care on longevity have suggested that increased health 
care expenditures do not contribute to increased life expectancy beyond age 40.   10
function is constituted by five variables:   
 
H_R: health care expenditure adjusted by the deflator (CPI Medical)   
Income_R:  annual  average  of  monthly  household  income  of  workers'  households 
adjusted by the deflator (CPI General Index)   
REP: relative price of health care (CPI MedicalʗCPI General Index) 
Phy_P: physicians per 10 thousands persons 
R65: the ratio of persons aged 65 and over 
 
Johansen’s method was adopted to obtain stationary relationship among those 
five variables. The results of the cointegration test are summarized in Table 3. The 
trace tests reject the hypothesis of no cointegrating vector at the 5 percent level, but 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vector. This result suggests 
that  there  is  one  stable  long-run  equilibrium  relationship.  Table  4  shows  the 
estimation results of VECM with the dummy variable, which takes the value of one 
in 1973-1974. T-values are shown in square brackets. It is noted that the speed of 
adjustment of the relative price of health care is almost two years (2.28 = 1/0.438).
We can consider that the estimation results are reflected in the fee schedule in a key 
biennial negotiation between insurers and providers. 
 
Table 3 Results of Cointegration Test (Health Care Function) 
Sample: 1958-2000 
Hypothesized Trace
Cointegrating eq Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.
None  0.60 80.54 69.82 0.01
At most 1 0.39 40.97 47.86 0.19
 




                        [4.04]                       [-2.49]       [-4.04]             [5.35]  
Coefficients of Speed of Adjustment 
˚ln(H_R) ˚ln(Income_R) ˚REP ˚(Phy_P) ˚lnR65
0.337 0.122 -0.438 -1.904 -0.042
[ 2.18 ] [ 1.63] [-3.72] [-0.62] [-1.70]  
 
Using  the  Lagrange  Multiplier  procedure,  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  serial 
correlation for VECM was rejected at the 5 percent significance level. Therefore, the 
residuals can be estimated using either the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) 
estimator which corrects for serial correlation and endogeneity of regressors. By 
comparison with DOLS estimators, we finally accepted the regression model with 
lead lags as an aggregated health care function because the standard deviation of   11
the regression model with lead lags was smaller than that of the regression model 
without lead lags.11  Table 5 shows the estimation result of the DOLS model with 
lead  lags.  Although  most  of  the  first-difference  series  were  not  statistically 
significant,  we  did  find  that  all  the  explanatory  variables  constituting  the 
cointegrating relation were statistically significant. The income elasticity of health 
care was about 0.7 and the elasticity of aging was beyond one in the long run. The 
estimated  coefficient  of  physician  density  was  almost  zero.  Using  the  estimated 
coefficient of relative price of health care, we can measure the changes in price 
elasticity of health care during the sample period and argue the price policy in the 
health care sector. Changes in the price elasticity of health care during the sample 
period are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Table 5 Dynamic OLS Model 
Dependent variable
ln(H_R)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant  4.767 2.510 1.899 0.069
ln(Income_R) 0.696 0.149 4.671 0.000
REP -0.645 0.120 -5.366 0.000
Phy_P -0.008 0.002 -4.221 0.000
lnR65 1.252 0.260 4.824 0.000
˚ln(Income_R)[1] 0.237 0.169 1.399 0.174
˚ln(Income_R) 0.317 0.305 1.039 0.308
˚ln(Income_R)[-1] 0.029 0.211 0.135 0.894
˚REP[1] -0.140 0.167 -0.837 0.410
˚REP -0.082 0.171 -0.479 0.636
˚REP[-1] -0.036 0.153 -0.238 0.814
˚Phy_P[1] -0.015 0.003 -4.262 0.000
˚Phy_P 0.003 0.006 0.537 0.596
˚Phy_P[-1] 0.000 0.006 -0.076 0.940
˚lnR65[1] -0.825 0.947 -0.872 0.391
˚lnR65 -2.039 0.778 -2.621 0.014
˚lnR65[-1] -0.473 0.755 -0.627 0.536
Adjusted R-squared 0.997
S.E. of regression 0.028
Durbin-Watson stat 1.473
 Sample: 1958 2000

We  can  see  the  price  elasticity  of  health  care  had  dramatically  declined  in 
absolute value since a universal health insurance system started and it had been 
around 0.6 since the early 1980s. Changes in price elasticity imply that health care 
was a luxury for the nation before a universal health insurance system started, but 
                                                   
11  Hayakawa and Kurozumi (2006) revealed that lead lags are not necessary when the cointegrating 
regression  error  does  not  Granger-cause  the  first  difference  of  the  I(1)  regressors.  Granger 
non-causality tests using second-order vector autoregressive model suggests that a few cointegrating 
regression errors did Granger-cause the first difference of the I(1) regressors in this study. The result 
indicates that we should not accept the VECM.   12
the  character  of  health  care  had  changed  because  of  the  introduction  of  health 
insurance.  A  free  health  service  system  by  which  the  elderly  did  not  make 
copayments at the time of medical service was established in 1973. The working 
generation had supported the system through contributions from employment and 
community plans plus funds from both national and local governments. As a result, 
the elderly who previously had been subject to small copayments increased their 
health care expenditures. We conclude that the policy which eliminated health care 
fees for the elderly in the 1970s was a grievous mistake. We should review the free 
health  service  system  for  the  elderly  in  the  second  half  of  1970s  because  the 
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We  examined  the  long-run  equilibrium  relationships  among  health  care 
expenditures per month, public pension benefits per beneficiaries and the social 
insurance burden rate in a cointegrating relation. The sample period of this study is 
1966-2002 because prices of medical services and drugs were cut by an average of 
2.7 percent in the 2002. The hypothesis that the pension benefits increased health 
care  expenditures  during  the  period  1966-2002  was  tested  using  VECM.  We 
obtained  one  stable  long-run  equilibrium  relationship  among  health  care 
expenditure  per  month,  public  pension  benefits  per  beneficiaries  and  the  social 
insurance burden rate. We employed the forecast error variance decomposition to 
examine the determination of social insurance burden rate. It is found that a health 
care shock accounts for 50 percent of the variance of social insurance burden rate 
after  the  first  six  years.  Health  care  shock  was  important  for  the  long-run 
determination of social insurance burden rate.   
Because it appears that a free health service system for the elderly (health care 
                                                   
12  Kumagai (2007) constructed a four-variable VAR model of the health sector over a sample period 
from November 1999 to March 2004 and concluded that the increase in the patient’s coinsurance rate 
had the effect of restraining health care costs but that a labor productivity shock did not have a 
permanent effect on the doctor consultation.   13
shock) caused the increase in the doctor's consultation, we estimated the health care 
function to analyze price policy in the health care sector. By using the Lagrange 
Multiplier  procedure, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for VECM was 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level. We continued to estimate DOLS models 
and finally accepted the regression model with lead lags as an aggregated health 
care  function  over  the  sample  period  from  1958  to  2000.  The  price  elasticity  of 
health care has declined in absolute value since the inception of a universal health 
insurance system, and it had been around 0.6 since the early 1980s. Although the 
increase in the doctor's  consultation of the elderly might had contributed to the 
decline in mortality, the elderly did not make copayments at the time of medical 
service under a free health service system. In terms of the economics of the policy in 
the long-run, we concluded that the policy which eliminated health care fees for the 
elderly in the 1970s was a mistake. The out-of-pocket expenses for health care of the 
elderly should have been raised in the 1970s. 
Another issue regarding health care expenditures at the macro level is the tax 
burden. Social security and the transfer to local governments are the largest source 
of  expenditure  expansion  for  the  central  government.  The  size  of  Japan’s  social 
security benefits has been over 80 trillion yen in recent years. The share of social 
security of the 2008 budget of the central government's expenditure was about 26.2 
percent. The contribution from the central government to the costs of social security 
is about 21.8 trillion yen. Health care is about 8.6 trillion yen and is the largest part 
of social security.13    Aging will increase the tax burden since uses for social security 
costs are weighted toward the elderly. We should pay attention to the growth rate of 
the  tax  burden.  The  financing  for  an  increased  public  burden  and  the 
intergenerational allocation of income remains an important issue in the future. 
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